Abstract Indian Buddhist sources speak of five sins of immediate retribution: murder of mother, father, an arhat, drawing the blood of a buddha, and creating a schism in the monastic community. This category provides the paradigm for sinfulness in Buddhism. Yet even these sins can and will, be expiated in the long run, demonstrating the overwhelmingly positive nature of Buddhist ethics.
the Buddha), for instance, we find the five listed as: matricide, patricide, murder of an arhat, 6 drawing the blood of a Buddha, and creating a schism. 7 The order of presentation in the scholastic Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of the Abhidharma) is rather:
8 matricide, patricide, murder of an arhat, creating a schism, and drawing the blood of a Buddha, 9 but when the text explicitly addresses the question of the hierarchy of severity of the items, its listing reads in ascending order:
10 patricide, matricide, murder of an arhat, drawing the blood of Buddha, and creating a schism. The text in fact specifies that of the five, patricide is the least heinous and the instigation of a schism the most severe.
11
There is general agreement that the most serious of the five is the instigation of a schism, which is no doubt motivated by the fact that this is the one crime which directly challenges the Buddhist monastic institution itself. There is less agreement over the first two items. The Manorathapū ran : ī (The Wish-Fulfiller), the Ceylonese Theravā da commentary to the A _ nguttara-Nikāya, enumerates the offences in descending order of severity, beginning from instigating a schism to drawing the blood of a Buddha to killing an arhat, and then explains the relative hierarchy of the two remaining items as follows:
12
If the father is principled and the mother unprincipled, or simply not [particularly] principled, patricide weighs more heavily in karmic terms. If the mother is principled, matricide [is worse]. If both are equally principled or equally unprincipled, matricide weighs more heavily in 6 In the case of Devadatta, it is made quite clear that the murder of a female arhat, an arhatī, is included in this category; see Lamotte (1944 Lamotte ( -1980 ). (The murder in question is that of the nun Utpalavarṅ ā.) 7 A _ nguttara-Nikāya (Morris & Hardy, 1885 -1900 iii.436,20-22 §VI.9.3 [87] , etc.). We should note that the order of listing is unlikely to have been motivated by the rules for compounding in Sanskrit or Pā li; in compound both orderings, mother-father and father-mother, are found in both languages. 8 Abhidharmakośabhās : ya ad IV.96. So the ordering in Mahāvyutpatti §8760-8764, apparently based on the Ekaśatakarma; in the latter text itself, however, the order is patricide, matricide, murder of an arhat, creating a schism, and drawing the blood of Buddha (T. 1453 [XXIV] 461c25-27 [juan 2]). 9 This ordering is certainly not unique to this text; the same is found for example in the Mū lasarvā stivāda Upasaṁ padājñ apti (Jinananda, 1961: 14.16-20) , Bhiks : ukarmavākya (Banerjee, 1977: 63.2-3) , and Vinayasū tra (Bapat & Gokhale, 1982: 23.20-21) , and the Mahāsāṁ ghika Lokottaravā din Bhiks : un : ī-Vinaya (Roth, 1970 §35, 43) . 10 Abhidharmakośabhās : ya ad 105ab. This is the order of presentation in the Dharmasaṁ graha §60 (Nishiwaki, 1962: 16) . The Vibhās : ā (T. 1545 [XXVII] 620c9-11 [juan 119]) agrees that the murder of one's mother is more severe than that of one's father. A number of other texts share this evaluation, such as the *Saṁ yuktābhidharmahr daya (T. 1552 [XXVIII] 898b24-25 [juan 4], translated in Dessein, 1999: 228) 11 Abhidharmakośa (Pradhan, 1975: 264.4, 10) 105ab: saṁ ghabhede mr s : āvādo mahāvadyatamo matah : , and then in the commentary sarvalaghuh : pitr vadhah : . 12 Walleser and Kopp (1924-1957) : ii.8,24-9,1 = Burmese Sixth Council edition (Dhammagiri-Pā li-Ganthamālā 41 [Dhammagiri, Igatpuri: Vipasanna Research Institute, 1995] ) 342.18-21: sace pitā sīlavā hoti mātā dussīlā no vā tathā sīlavatī pitughāto pat : isandhivasena vipaccati | sace mātā sīlavatī mātughāto* | dvīsu pi sīlena vā dussīlena vā samānesu mātughāto va pat : isandhivasena vipaccati | mātā hi dukkarakārinī bahū pakārā ca puttānan ti |. The variants are significant, especially in the phrase marked *, but I follow the Burmese text. karmic terms, for the mother is responsible for difficult tasks, and is very attentive to her sons.
13
This Ceylonese opinion, interestingly, seems to stand in at least partial opposition to one strongly stated Indian view which sees the murder of any woman, not just the mother, as a particularly serious offence. Already the Ś atapatha-Brāhman : a, a late Vedic text, states:
14
Prajā pati created Ś rī; she was resplendent. The gods said to Prajā pati ''Let us kill her and take (all) this from her.'' He said ''Surely, that Ś rī is a woman, and people do not kill a woman, but rather take (anything) from her (leaving her) alive.'' Later literatures, the Indian Epics, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyan : a, as well as law books and proverbial literature, stress the sinfulness of killing a woman. ''Women are not to be slain!'' both Epics repeatedly and categorically rule, comparing the killer of a woman even to the killer of a Brahmin, the worst criminal (from the point of view of the elite Brahmins, of course).
15 The murder of a woman is one of the four transgressions for which there is no expiation, such a crime leading to horrible retribution in hell, and subsequent rebirth as a worm, although it is important to note that this attitude is not universally held. 16 In any event, the mother is surely a very special case, despite the fact that at least one Ceylonese source does not see the matter wholly in black and white terms. The story of Maitrakanyaka is most 13 Note that a passage in the Divyāvadāna credits both father and mother with such generosity (Cowell & Neil, 1886: 51.20-22) : dus : karakārakau hi bhiks : avah : putrasya mātāpitarau āpyāyakau pos : akau saṁ vardhakau stanyasya dātārau citrasya jaṁ budvīpasya darśayitārau. ''Mother and father do what is difficult for a son, they are nurturers, nourishers, fosterers, givers of milk, teachers of multifarious ways of the world.'' In the Abhidharmakośabhās : ya (Pradhan, 1975: 263.9 , ad IV.103d) only the mother is so characterized (although at 262.22-23 both parents are called upakārin, benefactors, since they are the source of one's bodily existence, ātmabhāvasya tatprabhavatvāt).
Such notions belong not only to the Buddhists. A passage from the Mahābhārata, partially cited by Meyer (1930: 199, n . 1) says: ''Neither mother nor father is to be blamed, since they are both one's former benefactors. But, since she has endured suffering in carrying [one during pregnancy] , of the two the mother is the more venerable,'' na dū s : yau mātāpitarau tathā pū rvopakārin : au | dhāran : ād duh : khasahanāt tayor mātā garīyasī. (Meyer referred to a southern text, the so-called Kumbakonam version; I am grateful to Reinhold Gruenendahl [email 22 July 2004] for locating the passage in the Critical Edition in vol. 1, App. 37, lines 14-15, appended after 1,57.69f.) 14 Ś atapatha-Brāhman : a XI.4.3.2, quoted in Kane (1968 Kane ( -1977 : II.593 (I cite the translation of Eggeling [1882 Eggeling [ -1900 ). Nevertheless, in some Jaina stories thieves actually discuss this question, cited in Bloomfield (1926: 216) . 15 We note that it is passages like this which make absolutely clear the pervasive Brahmanical influence on the fundamentally kṡatriya or warrior class Epics. Of course, this influence is seen in a multitude of other dimensions as well, not least the fact that they were transmitted in Sanskrit, rather than in a vernacular language. 16 See Meyer (1930: 487-489) , with copious references to the Epic and legal literature, as well as Kane (1968 -1977 for additional references. See now also Hara (2003: 23-27) . It is true that, as Meyer (1930: 488, n . 1), details, not all legal texts treat such murders with the same seriousness, among the differences the most particular and obvious being the caste-wise differentiations in severity and, as Kane points out, some law books do authorize kings to punish women by death. See also Jamison (1996: 261, n. 21, and 1991: 216). instructive in this respect.
17 This popular tale, known in Southern Pā li and Northern Sanskrit sources alike, recounts the events which lead the protagonist to bear upon his head a blazing wheel of iron, a punishment which, it turns out, is undergone by sons who have struck their mothers. The notions of filiality which underlie this story clearly imply that an actual killing of one's mother is hardly even imaginable, although there are a number of examples of episodes in Indian Buddhist literature in which just such a case is not only imagined but explicitly depicted.
18 However multiple particular views here and there might be, the special status accorded women in general, and the mother in particular, in ancient Indian culture at large plainly informed Buddhist scholastics, and led them to almost uniformly rank the murder of a mother more severely than that of a father.
19
The standard list of five sins of immediate retribution is found in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature as well.
20 Peculiar, however, is a passage found in the Ā kāśagarbha-sū tra (The Womb of Space) which subordinates, or appears to subordinate, the five sins of immediate retribution to a list of five ''root transgressions,'' mū lāpatti, of a ruler. 21 The first of these crimes that a king might commit is the theft of monastic property; the second is criticism of Buddhist teachings, which is to say intervention in the internal doctrinal and policy affairs of the monastic community; and the third is forcible laicization or the application of judicial punishments to a monk, whether he is upstanding in his observation of the Buddhist monastic rules or not. It is only when it comes to the fourth item that the text lists the commission of the five sins of immediate retribution.
22 Finally, the fifth item concerns the king's adherence 17 I am grateful to Gregory Schopen for reminding me of the story in this context. See most centrally among the secondary literature Feer (1878), Brough (1957) , and Klaus (1983 Nanjio (1923: 138.9-10) : mātr pitrarhadvadhasaṁ ghabhedāh : tathāgatakāye dus : t : acittarudhirotpādaś ca. 21 Almost precisely the same is found in one Chinese translation of the *Bodhisattvagocaraupāyavis : ayavikurvan : anirdeśa, although the passage is absent both in the other Chinese version (T. 271) and the Tibetan translation (Tō h. 146, Ō tani 813) . See the Da sazheniganzi suoshuo jing 大薩遮尼乾子所説經, T. 272 (IX) 336b1-13 (juan 5). 22 The text is cited in Sanskrit in the Ś iks : āsamuccaya. The full passage is at Bendall (1897 Bendall ( -1902 ; the passage concerning the five ānantarya is 60.3-5, which I cite here on the basis of the manuscript, Cambridge Add. 1478, folio 35a4-5: yah : punah : ks : atriyah : saṁ cintya mātaraṁ jīvitād vyaparopayati pitaram arhantaṁ bhagavacchrāvakam vā jīvitād vyaparopayati samagram vā saṁ ghaṁ bhinatti tathāgatasyārhatah : samyaksaṁ bu[ddha]*sya sañ cintya dus : t : acitto rudhiram utpā(da)**yati || (* omitted in the ms; ** ms damaged). (Cp. the translation in Bendall and Rouse (1922: 62) .) The original scripture being quoted is found in T. 405 (XIII) 651c9-652a16, with the relevant passage at 651c28-652a1 (the same is then repeated here and in the other translations with regard not to kings but to their ministers); T. 406 (XIII) 659a10-29, with the relevant passage at 659a18-19; T. 407 (XIII) 665a11-b9, with the relevant passage at 665a24-26; T. 408 (XIII) 671b22-c24, with the relevant passage at 671c6-9 (juan shang); and in Tibetan at Derge Kanjur 260, mdo sde, za 272b2-273b3, with the relevant passage at 273a2-4. Note that the series of transgressions is summarized by Ś ā ntideva in verse at Bendall (1897 Bendall ( -1902 .
to heretical (not only non-Buddhist but completely non-mainstream) ideas which deny an individual's karmic responsibility for his own actions.
23 One might easily be tempted to suggest that such a subordination of the five sins of immediate retribution to the set of five royal transgressions is to be understood as part of an effort to expand and universalize Buddhist ethics by increasing the range of behaviors stipulated to be entirely beyond the pale-and certainly Indian Buddhist literature has examples of just such broadenings.
24 On the other hand, when we look closely at these five root transgressions, and bear in mind that they are made to apply specifically to rulers (the scripture says ''consecrated kṡatriyas,'' which is to say kings), we come to recognize that the expansion functions in one particular dimension only. The Ā kāśagarbha-sū tra is concerned to establish doctrinal and religious grounds for the protection of the Buddhist monastic institution and its resources, Buddhist doctrine and policy, and Buddhist monks from royal control. It prosecutes this agenda by suggesting that any royal (governmental) attempts to confiscate property, exert influence on teachings, or bring monks within the purview of the civil or state legal system would constitute not merely a violation of the trust that Buddhist apologists have always tried to suggest exists between the monastic institution and the rulers, but more fundamentally a violation of the very norms of civilized and moral behavior. In this light, the inclusion in the list of the five ''root transgressions'' of the five sins of immediate retribution and the denial of personal karmic, and therefore moral, responsibility only as the last two items effectively subordinates the most basic moral standards of civil society (item four), and the only effective limitation on consequenceless actions (item five), to the correspondingly superordinated necessity of maintaining the independence of the Buddhist monastic community.
25 It is more important, the authors of this scripture are saying in this reading, for a ruler to respect the independence of the Buddhist monastic community even than it is for him to avoid such crimes as the murder of his parents. We have, of course, no way of knowing if, how or in what way such an attempt at propaganda might have been received, 26 although the fact that the passage in question was repeatedly cited by later Indian anthologies of Buddhist scriptures, and continues to be cited even in modern Tibetan 23 The association of such ideas with the sins of immediate retribution is found in Pā li sources as well, as noted by La Vallé e Poussin (1923-1931: iii.201-202 , in the note). 24 See for instance the passage in the Gan : d : avyū ha at Suzuki and Idzumi (1949: 228) , and compare the translation (from Chinese) in Cleary (1984 -1987 . 25 It is true that, as we have seen, the list of the five sins of immediate retribution itself proceeds in increasing order of severity, such that the last item is worse than the first. There is no indication that such a logic might be appealed to here, and in fact the concern expressed in the very first item for freedom from the danger of state fiscal expropriation argues for a descending order of seriousness here. If the listing of the items were hierarchical, we would be forced to conclude that its authors considered the bringing of an individual monk into the control of the state judicial apparatus to be more serious than state expropriation of corporate monastic resources. I very much doubt this is the case. 26 We may indeed wonder whether kings normally cared at all what the Buddhists wrote in their scriptures.
works, suggests that it struck a certain chord at least with some Buddhist authors.
27
In spite of what I have just suggested, however, the ultimate lesson we may draw from the Ā kāśagarbha-sū tra's evocation of the five sins of immediate retribution is, I believe, quite different. Perhaps paradoxically, the way in which the scripture employs the five sins of immediate retribution cannot be used as evidence for any genuine subordination of that idea; rather, the passage seems to demonstrate precisely the opposite. The authors of the Ā kāśagarbha-sū tra, by choosing to frame their appeal for the extraterritoriality of Buddhist institutions, ideas and individuals in the context of a set of five transgressions, and by utilizing within that pentad as two items the five sins of immediate retribution and the pan-Indian, and perhaps pan-human, idea of personal ethical responsibility, actually emphasize their own assumption of the universality of these five sins of immediate retribution as the epitome of immoral behavior. Did these ideas not represent a generally accepted standard, they would not be effective in highlighting the revaluation the text attempts in its effort to propound an ethical basis for the defence of Buddhist institutional autonomy. What allows the sū tra's authors to appear to subordinate this fivefold category can be nothing other than their tacit recognition of that very category as a gold-standard, a touch-stone with which to establish and orient subsequent categorizations of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. If this reading of the text is correct, the Ā kāśagarbha-sū tra's apparent subordination of the five sins of immediate retribution to another category of transgressions is instead to be understood, ultimately, as an affirmation of the suggestive force of the former, and thus a recognition of its paradigmatic status.
Even if there lingers some minor disagreement over their respective hierarchical ordering, the meaning of the first three of the five sins of immediate retribution is nevertheless straightforward. That of the final two is somewhat less so. Although we cannot enter into detail here on the complex question of schism in Indian Buddhist thought, it is important to notice an interesting restriction on the individual who is legally qualified to motivate a schism. According to a number of Sthavira lineage texts, including both the Pāli Theravā da Vinaya and the Sarvā stivāda Abhidharmakośabhās : ya (Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma), a monastic community can only be split by one who is a genuine monk in good standing within a regular monastic community. The Pāli Cullavagga (Lesser Division of the Vinaya) tells us, for instance, that ''Only a regular monk in good standing, 28 belonging to the same 27 In addition to the citation in the Ś iks : āsamuccaya cited above, the same is found repeatedly, for instance in Indian works such as the Sū trasamuccaya (Pāsā dika, 1989a: 83.15-19) and Bodhicaryāvatārapañ jikā (La Vallé e Poussin, 1901 -1914 [which abbreviates the passage, having here only pañcānantaryes : v anyatamakaran : āt]), and in later Tibetan works such as the late eleventh century ''Jewel Ornament of Liberation'' of Sgam po pa (Guenther, 1959: 166) , and more recently in the 19th century ''Infinite Ocean of Knowledge'' of Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas (Tayé , 1998: 176) . 28 I adopt this rather cumbersome circumlocution for pakatatta, which indicates a monk who is not subject to any disciplinary restrictions on his monastic status, and is thus not only a monk, but in good standing vis-a-vis the rules of monastic conduct. See Nolot (1996, nn. 18, 19, 27, 50 The idea appears to be rather simple: Buddhist technical literature acknowledges the possibility that schism might occur within a monastic community. In fact, it seems to accept this as an inevitability. What it insists upon, however, is that any action to instigate such a schism must be brought about by a legitimate, and indeed respected and honorable, member of the community in question, and only upon reflection and never impulsively.
31 This cannot but strike us as peculiar, since the same literature which sets these conditions nevertheless holds the instigation of a schism to be the most serious of the five sins of immediate retribution.
32 A solution to this apparent contradiction awaits further research.
Finally, there is the question of how anyone may be, literally, accused of the remaining transgression from the classic set of five, drawing the blood of a Buddha. It would seem that without the presence of a Buddha one cannot do him any injury, and thus no one in the period after the lifetime of the Buddha may be guilty of this particular offence, regardless of his or her degree of 29 Oldenberg (1879 29 Oldenberg ( -1883 ) (VII.5.1): bhikkhu kho upāli pakatatto samānasaṁ vāsako samānasīmāya t : hito saṁ ghaṁ bhindatī ti. Translated also in Horner (1938 Horner ( -1966 ). 30 Pradhan (1975: 261.7-11) (IV.100ab, with commentary) : kah : punar es : a saṁ ghaṁ bhinatti | bhiks : ur dr kcarito vr ttī bhinatti bhiks : ur bhinatti na gr hī na bhiks : un : yādayah : | sa ca dr s : t : icarita eva na tr s : n : ācaritah : | vr ttastho na bhinnavr ttas tasyānādeyavākyatvāt | See the translation in La Vallé e Poussin (1923-1931: iv.208) , and note Yaśomitra's commentary in Wogihara (1936: 427.17-22 31 In this regard we might also notice the brief discussion in the Kathāvatthu regarding the claim ''That the five cardinal crimes, even if unintentionally committed, involve retribution immediately after death'' (trans. Aung & Rhys Davids, 1915: 343, Book XX.1) . In this context the problem of schism is also discussed. In the Samantapāsādikā we find causistry regarding unintentional patricide and so on (for convenience see Bapat & Hirakawa, 1970: 321) . 32 We may recall here the paradigmatic case of Devadatta, who clearly was a regularly ordained monk, and thus uniquely liable to the technical accusation of instigation of a schism. One may consult briefly the note in Lamotte (1944 Lamotte ( -1980 ii.873-874, n. 1).
depravity.
33 Eighty years after his birth the Buddha died, and was therefore thenceforth no longer present. Practically no one disputes this, and even those who uphold an essentially docetic view of the Buddha as thoroughly transcendent and transmundane, 34 and hence as not gone and dead, so to speak, would perforce and correspondingly be constrained to admit the impossibility of harm coming to such a transcendent being.
35 Traditional Buddhist scholars, nonetheless, can always find a way to preserve every category and every list inherited from the tradition.
Drawing the blood of a Buddha is thus understood to mean, in a Buddhaless world, the destruction or damaging of a stū pa, the memorial mound which encases relics of the Buddha.
36 This makes perfect sense from the perspective of Buddhist doctrine, once one understands the stū pa as equivalent, legally and otherwise, to the Buddha, as recent scholarship has demonstrated may be the case.
37 Moreover, commentaries and even inscriptional references tend to make clear that the destruction of a stū pa is not, itself, exactly a sin of immediate retribution, but rather ''resembles'' such a sin, or is functionally equivalent to it.
38 In fact, the scholastic tradition extends the entire list of five sins of immediate retribution by means of a new set of 33 In the Mahāsāṁ ghika Bhiks : un : ī-Vinaya (Roth, 1970 §35, 43) , following the listing of this item as one of the actions or situations which restrict one's access to ordination (to be discussed below), that is, having performed which one may not be ordained, the text says: ciraparinivr to kho puna so bhagavāṁ s tathāgato 'rhan samyaksambuddho, ''although that Blessed One, Tathā gata, Arhat, Complete and Perfect Buddha is already long in nirvāṅ ā .' ' Nolot (1991: 20, n. 48) , draws attention in this context to the fact that in modern ordination rituals, the ordinand in taking refuge in the Buddha (in the formula: ''I take refuge in the Buddha; I take refuge in the Dharma; I take refuge in the Saṁ gha'') adds ''although he is long in nirvāṅ a.'' As far as I know, the texts which discuss this question do not raise the possibility of one doing harm to a (living) Buddha in another world-realm. 34 I am thinking of those who might uphold views such as those espoused by Mahāsāṁ ghika Lokottaravā dins, the authors of the Lotus Sū tra or the Upāyakauśalya, and so on. For a brief discussion of some parallel issues, see Silk (2003) . 35 Actually, we find this idea elsewhere as well. As Peter Skilling tells us (2003: 288, n. 3): ''According to the Pā li commentaries, the blood of a Tathā gata cannot literally be shed, because his body cannot be wounded (abhejjakāyatā). 'Lohituppā da' means a congealing of blood within the body, where it comes together in one spot, under unbroken skin. In other words, it is a bruise. …'' Skilling does not cite references, but according to Trenckner et al. (1924) , s.v. abhejjakā yatā, the passage is found in the Manorathapū ran : ī (ii.6,11), Papañ casū danī (iv.110,27) and Vibha _ ngat : t : hakathā (Sammohavinodanī) (427,4). 36 This issue has recently been discussed by Skilling (2003) .
37 See a number of the papers collected in Schopen (1997) . These five belong to the same category as the five sins of immediate retribution, in corresponding order. One defiles one's mother who is an arhat through the performance of unchaste acts; one murders a bodhisattva who is certain [to become a Buddha]; one murders a practitioner who has not yet reached the stage of becoming an arhat; one steals the wealth of the monastic community;
41 one destroys a stū pa.
Yaśomitra's commentary to this passage makes explicit the equivalences implied by the expression ''in corresponding order'': Defilement of one's mother who is an arhat belongs to the same category as matricide; murder of a bodhisattva certain to become a Buddha belongs to the same category as patricide; murder of a practitioner who has not yet reached the stage of becoming an arhat belongs to the same category as the murder of an arhat himself; theft of the wealth of the monastic community belongs to the same category as creating a schism in that same community; and the destruction of a 39 Abhidharmakośa and bhās : ya ad IV.106-107ab, in Pradhan (1975: 264.22-265.4 ) (Tibetan in Derge Tanjur 4090, mngon pa, ku 219a1-4). The passage was translated by La Vallé e Poussin (1923-1931: iii.219-220) who, it is important to point out for what follows, sees two actions in the beginning of the verse, ''souiller sa mè re, souiller une Arhantī.'' Note that the same list of five is given in the Mahāvyutpatti §2330-2334 where, however, the classification ( §2329) is termed upānantarīya, a term I have not seen elsewhere. However, Harunaga Isaacson brings to my attention the quotation of the verse and a half in the Guhyasamājatantra-Pradīpodyotana-t : īkā (Chakravarti, 1984: 46.24-47 .2), which labels the five upānantaryāni, and in verse 14 of the Cittaviśuddhiprakaran : a (Patel, 1949) , we find the term upānantaryakāran : a. 40 The term I have rendered ''defilement,'' dū s : an : a, certainly implies unwelcome attention, and therefore might well be rendered ''rape.'' 41 Pradhan prints sukhāyadvārikaṁ ; Hirakawa et al. (1973: 432) suggest emending to mukha°. The Tibetan translation has zhal du 'du ba'i sgo, demonstrating that mukha°was the reading before the Tibetan translators. The Vyākhyā (Wogihara 1936: 430.27 ) is printed as sukha°, but see La Vallé e Poussin's citation (1923-1931: iv.219, n. 2) with mukha°.
stū pa belongs to the same category as drawing the blood of a Buddha. 42 We can hardly fail to notice here that the very first item refers to incest with one's own mother, although the terms in which this text states the nature of this offence are odd.
I have translated in accord with what I think is the only way to understand the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakośabhās : ya, and Yaśomitra's commentary thereon, and in agreement with the interpretation of the Chinese and Tibetan translators.
43 Some light might be shed on the issue by a look at the parallel list in the encyclopedic Yogācārabhū mi (Stages of the Yoga Practitioner). In the list in the Abhidharmakośabhās : ya, it is not clear why it should be a crime equally as serious as one meriting immediate retribution to have sexual relations with one's own mother only if she happens to be a saint. As far as I know, commentaries are silent on this point. This is doubly peculiar since the same literature has already made it abundantly clear that sexual relations with one's own mother are forbidden, the list of forbidden women in the Abhidharmakośabhās : ya comprising the wife of another, one's mother, one's daughter, and maternal or paternal kinswomen.
44 Moreover, it might be relevant to note that in the Abhidharmakośabhās : ya's own discussion of the possibility of double culpability for the murder of one's father who is an arhat, we read:
45 ''Who would kill his father, an arhat, would be [guilty of] only one sin of immediate retribution, because the bodily basis [of the act of murder] is 42 Sphut : ārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, in Wogihara (1936: 430.21-28 ) (Tibetan in Derge Tanjur 4092, mngon pa, ngu 78b6-79a2). The text goes on to explain that according to the opinion of Vasumitra, theft of the wealth of the monastic community means forcible confiscation of permanent endowments. Yaśomitra agrees, and explains that what is meant by the expression ''removal of the wealth of the monastic community'' is the forcible confiscation of that upon which the monastic community depends for its continued existence, precisely the sort of concern we saw expressed in the Ā kāśagarbha-sū tra above.
In his detailed study of chapter four of the Abhidharmakośa and Yaśomitra's commentary, this discussion has been passed over by Funahashi (1954: 357-358 ) without a word. 43 The appositional reading of this item is clearly confirmed by both the Tibetan and Chinese translations of the Abhidharmakośa, as well as the Tibetan translation of Yaśomitra's commentary. In Xuanzang's translation, the verse (T. 1558 [XXIX] 94b23 [juan 18]) has 汚母無學尼, and the prose commentary (94b27-28) 謂有於母阿羅漢尼行極汚染、謂非梵行. In Paramā rtha's translation, the same is (T. 1559 [XXIX] 249a1 [juan 13]) 汚母阿羅漢, and in the commentary (249a3-4) 若人汚壞自母阿羅漢、由行非梵行故, while the Tibetan translation has in both the verse and commentary the clearly appositional ma dgra bcom ma (and the same in the rendering of Yaśomitra's treatise). As did La Vallé e Poussin (see above), Mochizuki (1932 Mochizuki ( -1936 Mochizuki ( : 1125c understood the Chinese expression to mean ''one's mother and an arhantī,'' but his basis for this is unclear. 44 Abhidharmakośabhās : ya ad IV.74ab (Pradhan, 1975: 244.14-15) : catus : prakāram agamyagamanaṁ kāmamithyācārah : | agamyāṁ gacchati paraparigr hītāṁ vā mātaraṁ duhitaraṁ vā mātr pitr saṁ bandhinīṁ vā. The passage is translated in La Vallé e Poussin (1923-1931: iv.157 (1923-1931: iv.215). singular.'' So in this light too the text's wording of the first item looks odd. In the parallel in the Yogācārabhū mi, however, the first item is quite clearly stated to be sexually approaching a female arhat or one's mother, 46 which seems to make considerably better sense.
One additional passage appears to reflect the same idea. The Tathāgata-guhyakośa, extant in its entirety only in Chinese but here quoted in Sanskrit, offers a list of the worst sorts of offences, which begins as follows:
47
If one were, Kāśyapa, to deprive of life either his father or a pratyekabuddha, that would be the worst of the sins of killing. The worst of thefts is the stealing of property belonging to the Three Jewels. The worst of sexually depraved acts is to violate either one's mother or an arhatī.
We noticed above Yaśomitra's suggestions of the correspondence between the five sins of immediate retribution and those sins of the same category. The 46 Bhattacharya (1957: 185.20-186 .1), Chinese in T. 1579 (XXX) 318b21-22 (juan 9), Tibetan Derge Tanjur 4035, sems tsam, tshi 93b7. The Sanskrit, which is somewhat corrupt, reads (with Bhattacharya's n. 1 on 186): ānantaryasabhāgāni punah : | yathāpīhaikatyo 'rhantīṁ vā gacchati mātaraṁ vā. The Chinese is also quite explicit: 無間業 同 分者、謂如有一、於阿羅漢尼及於母 所、行穢染行. The Tibetan reads: mtshams med pa dang mthun pa rnams ni | 'di ltar 'di na kha cig dgra bcom ma 'am ma la nyal ba 'am.
The other four items in this list are rather different, and read as follows (Yogācārabhū mi, in Bhattacharya (1957: 186.1-6) To strike a bodhisattva who is in his last life before attaining buddhahood. Or to kill animals in temples, or at crossroads. Or to plot against, cheat or banish trusted friends who have the greatest confidence in one, or acquaintances or intimates, Or again having taken care, without recompense, of the suffering, the destitute, those without any protection or recourse and those who come to one for shelter, then later to try to harm them and cause them pain. Or to confiscate the wealth of the monastic community. Or to destroy a shrine. Such similar acts are called those of the same category as sins of immediate retribution. 47 In Sanskrit in the Ś iks : āsamuccaya and Subhās : itasaṁ graha (Bendall, 1897 -1902 : 171.13-16 = 1903 -1904 [folio 99]): yah : kāśyapa pitā ca syāt pratyekabuddhaś ca taṁ jīvitād vyaparopayed idam agraṁ prān : ātipātānāṁ | idam agram adattādānānāṁ yad uta triratnadravyāpaharan : atā | idam agraṁ kāmamithyācārān : āṁ yad uta mātā ca syād arhantī ca tāṁ cādhyāpadyet*| * Bendall read adhyāpat : yet, corrected by Edgerton 1953 s.v. adhyāpat : yati. Derge Tanjur 3940, dbu ma, khi 96a7-b2: de bzhin gshegs pa'i mdzod kyi mdo las gsungs pa | 'od srungs gang gis pha yang yin la | rang sangs rgyas kyang yin pa de srog bcad na de'i srog gcod pa'i nang nas ma rungs pa'o || 'di lta ste | dkon mchog gsum gyi dkor rku ba 'di ni ma byin par len pa'i nang na ma rungs pa'o || 'di lta ste ma yang yin la dgra bcom ma yang yin pa de la log par spyad pa 'di ni 'dod pa la log par spyod pa rnams kyi nang na ma rungs pa'o || T. 1636 (XXXII) 109a27-b2: 如來藏經云。佛言。迦葉波、有十不善業道、是爲大罪。此最極殺 生者、謂若殺父斷縁覺命。 最極不與取者、謂若欺奪三寶財物。最極欲邪行者、謂起汚母及無學 尼。T. 821 (XVII) 844c10-13 (juan xia): 迦葉、如人有父得縁覺道、子斷父命、名殺中重。奪三 寶物、名盜中重。若復有人、其母出家得羅漢道、共爲不淨、是婬中重。 The indication in Bendall (1897 Bendall ( -1902 : 407 that the citation is from the Tathāgatagarbha-sū tra is an error; I owe the correct identification to my friend Tō ru Tomabechi. Moreover, this identification was made already by Izumi Hō kei in Ono (1932 Ono ( -1935 ). Note that the Chinese translation of the sū tra itself (T. 821) appears to correspond rather to the Abhidharmakośa's understanding that the mother is herself an arhantī, which does not appear to be the intention of the Indic text or its translations in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the Ś iks : āsamuccaya.
latter are likewise coordinated with the more basic set of sins in various ways by East Asian commentaries on the Yogācārabhū mi.
48 (Kui)ji's Yuqieshidilun lü ezuan 瑜伽師地論略纂 offers the following scheme:
49
Defiling a female arhat and a mother = matricide. Injuring a bodhisattva in his last existence = patricide. Committing murder in a temple (or other sacred precinct), causing injury in a place of refuge, or offering safe haven to those who are in trouble and then causing them injury = murder of an arhat. Stealing from the monastic community = causing a schism. Destroying stū pas and so on = drawing the blood of a Buddha.
This text goes on to discuss its disagreement with the analysis of the Abhidharmakośabhās : ya. Otherwise, after quoting Kuiji's analysis, his contemporary the Korean commentator Toryun 遁倫 (better Tullyun 道倫?) in his Yuqie lunji 瑜伽論記 offers yet another series of correspondences:
50
Defiling a female arhat = murder of an arhat. Defiling a mother = matricide. Injuring a bodhisattva in his last existence and destroying stū pas = drawing the blood of a Buddha. Stealing from the monastic community = causing a schism. The remainder [unspecified, but in context perhaps to be understood as committing murder in a temple, causing injury in a place of refuge, or offering safe haven to those who are in trouble and then causing them injury?] = patricide.
Though neither of these texts is Indian, the diversity with which they interpret the category is nevertheless noteworthy. An additional curious feature of the category of the five sins similar to those of immediate retribution is the extension of the idea that the murder of an arhat is a heinous crime to include within the ''same category'' the murder of anyone who is not as far advanced along the path to perfection as is the arhat. When the texts maintain that the murder of a śaiks : a, which is to say one ''with things left to learn,'' is as serious as the murder of an arhat, who is an aśaiks : a, one ''with nothing left to learn,'' this seems to signal a rather radical devaluing of the seriousness of the murder of the arhat, which may be a reason that the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhās : ā, whose defence of the arhat's perfection among other things characterizes its critique of the Mahāsāṁ ghikas, explicitly rejects the equivalence of the two crimes.
51 Similar remarks might be made about the 48 These lists are cited in Mochizuki (1932 Mochizuki ( -1936 Mochizuki ( : 2.1126a ).
49 T. 1829 (XLIII) 50b11-16 (juan 4). See Deleanu (2006: 251) .
50 T. 1828 (XLII) 360a15-17 (3/1). On the commentary and the commentator, see Deleanu (2006: 251-252, and 269-270, nn. 37-40 Yet a farther extension is evident in a Tantric text, the Guhyasamājatantra Pradīpodyotana-t : īkā-s : at : kot : ivyākhyā attributed to a certain Candrakīrti. There we find the five sins of immediate retribution listed as murder of one's mother, father, a monk (bhikṡu, not arhat!), destruction of an image of the Buddha (buddha-pratimā-bheda), and opposing the True Teaching (saddharma-pratiks : epaka). Here the question of how to deal with the crime of violence against the Buddha in a post-Buddha world is dealt with by replacing the Buddha with his image. Additionally, the murder of any monk replaces the murder of an arhat, and opposition to orthodoxy replaces the much more technical transgression of the creation of a schism.
53
To another type of discourse belong passages of philosophical reinterpretation of the category of the five sins of immediate retribution, such as the following in Xuanzang's translation of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa:
54
It would be better to become guilty of the five acts of immediate fruition than to be like us holy ones who are completely delivered. And why? Because those who become guilty of the five ānantarya still have the power to destroy these ānantarya, to produce the thought of supreme and perfect enlightenment and gradually attain all the Buddhadharmas. While we, Arhats, who have destroyed our impurities, will never be capable of it.
A passage in the Pitr putrasamāgama takes a śū nyavā din stance:
55
All things, Blessed One, are awakening; they should be known as lacking in intrinsic nature. Even the sins of immediate retribution are awakening. How so? Because, Blessed One, awakening is devoid of essential nature, and the five sins of immediate retribution are devoid of essential nature. Thus even the sins of immediate retribution are said to be awakening.
52 Oldenberg (1879 Oldenberg ( -1883 ii.173,23-24) (Cullavagga VI.17.3), with a translation in Horner (1938 Horner ( -1966 ). The additional term is bhikkhunīdū saka. Note too that in the Mū lasarvā stivāda Vinayasū tra (Bapat & Gokhale, 1982: 23.21-22) , in the context of those restricted from ordination, immediately after the five sins of immediate retribution is listed bhiks : un : īdū s : aka, precisely equivalent to the Pā li term. (The term is normal for such lists, but it is not always placed adjacent to or amidst the enumeration of the sins of immediate retribution.) 53 Chakravarti (1984: 46.21-47.5 ). I owe the reference to Harunaga Isaacson.
54 Lamotte (1976: 179) (VII §4), translating T. 476 (XIV) 575c25-29 (juan 4). Other versions of the sū tra do not explain things in quite the same way. 55 Quoted in the Ś iks : āsamuccaya, Cambridge Add. 1478, folio 113b7-8 = Bendall (1897 Bendall ( -1902 : sarvvadharmā bhagavan \ bodhih : | svabhāvavirahitā boddhavyāh : | antaśa ānantaryān : y api bodhih : | tat kasya hetor aprakr tikā hi bhagavan \ bodhir aprakr tikāni ca pañcānantaryān : i | tenocyate ānantaryān : y api bodhir iti.
Similar is the intent of a passage from a text cited under the title Satyadvayāvatara:
56
The equality, from the ultimate point of view, Devaputra, of thusness, the dharma-realm and eternal non-production is the equality, from the ultimate point of view, of the five sins of immediate retribution. The equality of the five sins of immediate retribution is the equality of the appropriations of philosophical views.
This passage continues with such equivalences until it equates, from the ultimate point of view, nirvāṅ a with non-production (anutpāda), itself equivalent to saṁ sā ra. Such uses of the concept, however, clearly belong to a discourse different from that which assumes the literal idea.
57
What of the retribution promised to those who commit one of the five sins? There is no notion of eternal damnation in Buddhism, but the performance of even one of the five sins leads to necessary and immediate suffering in hell. That suffering, however, is inevitably temporary. The punishment even for multiple occurrences of these gravest of sins is emphatically not damnation as such, although some sources suggest that multiple transgressions require correspondingly longer periods of suffering to recompense. The one possible exception to the claim that (at least Indian) Buddhism knows no idea of eternal damnation is the doctrine of the icchantika. But even here, the core concept is actually quite distinct.
The problem of the meaning of the icchantika in Buddhism is extremely vexed, confronting, as it does, the very question of the universality of access to awakening and therefore the ultimacy of Buddhism as a spiritual path.
58
Fortunately, none of these complex questions are directly germane to the issue to be taken up here. Rather, the problem here is the nature of evil acts, and the type of recompense that Buddhist sources envision as possible. Could it be argued that the five sins of immediate retribution are not, in fact, the most serious moral offences imagined by Indian Buddhist theorists, since the highest criticism is instead reserved for the icchantika? To frame the question in this way is to mix categories that at least the systematic doctrinal texts keep distinct. Moreover, the harshest judgement, at least in this systematic literature, is reserved for another individual who is sometimes treated as distinct from the icchantika, the agotraka, the individual entirely bereft of the potentiality for Buddhahood.
56 Quoted in the Prasannapadā, La Vallé e Poussin (1903-1913: 374.6-7) : yas samā devaputra paramārthatas tathatā dharmadhātur atyantājātiś ca tat samāni paramārthatah : pañcānantaryān : i | yat samāni pañcānantaryān : i tat samāni dr s : t : ikr tāni. I have not been able to identify the scriptural source of this passage. 57 I similarly omit mention here of Tantric texts which employ intentionally shocking imagery suggesting that one may obtain liberation through such radical violations as the five sins of immediate retribution. This rhetoric too belongs to an entirely different discourse. 58 The classic study which sets the frame for such discussions is Ruegg (1969) . For some hint as to the considerable debate some of these materials have caused in recent years, see Hubbard and Swanson (1997) .
One of the most important, and probably the earliest, of the Indian scriptural sources for the doctrine of the icchantika is the Mahāyāna Mahāpari-nirvān : a-sūtra. However, the portrayal of the icchantika in this text is not thoroughly consistent.
59 Several passages illustrate a range of opinions:
60
Gentle son, an example: while a physician skilled in the eight branches of the Ā yurveda can cure all varieties of illness, he is unable to cure what is incurable. Just so, while all the scriptures and concentrations can cure everyone afflicted with the illnesses of lust, hatred and delusion, and clear up even all the afflictions of the defilements, they are unable to cure those who commit a pārājika offence and those who commit the sins of immediate retribution.
[Another] example: while a physician who knows the supreme lore of the Ā yurveda can cure the illnesses of all beings, even he is unable to cure an illness which has already killed [the patient]. Just so, while this very Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra can cure all the illnesses of the defilements of all beings, and fix them toward the attainment of awakening, this does not include the icchantika who resembles one who has already died.
[Another] example: If one born blind is not aware even of the moon, how can he see anything at all clearly? A great physician, however, may cure those of weak eyesight and cause them to see, but this does not include the individual born blind. Just so, while this very Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra may cure the eyes of all auditors and lone buddhas who resemble the visually impaired, quickly causing them to see the eye of the Mahāyā na, and fix toward awakening even those who commit a pārājika offence and those who commit sins of immediate retribution and cling to the belief that it is not necessary to make the aspiration to awakening, this does not include the icchantika who is completely blinded.
According to the first example here, those monastics who commit a pārājika offence, the most serious violation of the monastic code, and those who commit a sin of immediate retribution are incurable.
61 This would suggest that we understand such offenders as essentially equivalent to the icchantika, since 59 This is so even leaving aside the whole issue of the various versions of the text which, probably, evolved over time, and the impact this evolution and its subsequent transmission had on the development of Buddhist doctrine in China, as exemplified in the controversy involving Daosheng 道生 in the fourth century, on which see, for instance, Liebenthal (1955 Liebenthal ( : 83-88, 1956 . For the sake of simplicity, here I refer only to the Tibetan translation. 60 Lhasa Kanjur 122, mdo sde, nya 190a7-191a2; Derge Kanjur 120, mdo sde, tha 130b6-131a6; Peking Kanjur 788, mdo sde, tu 134b7-135a6; Mochizuki (1988: 433-435) . Mochizuki (1988) edited a number of passages from the text on the basis of the Lhasa, Derge and Peking editions. However, at least his citations of the Derge edition, the only one to which I have access at present, are not always entirely accurately, and therefore I translate from the Derge edition directly, while citing his quotations for reference. For each passage Mochizuki also gives a Japanese reading of the Chinese translations, and a modern Japanese translation from Tibetan. 61 Or perhaps the text means, those who commit all four pārājikas-briefly, sex, murder, theft, unjustifiable public claims to supernatural powers-and all five sins of immediate retribution? the latter is also incurable. This would certainly seem to be supported by several further passages in the same text:
62
Gentle son, an example: the tightly closed petals of a lotus flower bloom when struck by the rays of the sun. Just so, immediately upon hearing this Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra even all the beings who think even the production of the term ''aspiration to awakening'' unnecessary [much less actually producing the aspiration itself, and are thus ''closed'' to the possibility of awakening, like a flower with petals closed] will effortlessly inject the cause of awakening into all the hairs [of their body]. Although even icchantikas possess the tathāgatagarbha, still it is as if within a thick covering. An example: the silk worm surrounds itself and is unable to emerge [from its cocoon] without making an opening. Just so, even the tathāgatagarbha is not able to emerge from within the icchantika due to the fault of his karma. Therefore, as long as saṁ sā ra lasts he will not obtain the cause of awakening.
And again:

63
[A monk] asks: What is the icchantika? [The Buddha] said: A monk, nun, male or female lay disciple may be one. One who having rejected the scriptures with unpleasant speech does not, subsequently, even ask for forgiveness has entered into the path of the icchantika. Those who have committed the four pārājikas and those who have committed the five sins of immediate retribution, who even if they are aware that they have entered into a fearful place do not perceive it as fearful, who do not attach themselves to the side of the true teachings and without making any efforts at all think ''let's get rid of the true teachings,'' who proclaim even that that very [teaching] is blameworthy-they too have entered into the path of the icchantika. Those who claim ''There is no Buddha, there is no teaching, there is no monastic community'' are also said to have entered the path of the icchantika. With the exception of the icchantika, it is praiseworthy to make donations to all (religious people).
Here the text can hardly be understood otherwise than as identifying with the icchantika those who are guilty of a variety of objectionable behaviors and attitudes. The first passage in particular, by saying that the reason for the icchantika's inability to actualize his inherent but latent seed of awakening is his karma, certainly seems to be saying that it is the fault of some actions taken in the past that the icchantika is forever cut off from awakening. When, however, we return to the third item in the first set of examples (and the text continues with further instances in the same vein), we see an explicit 62 Lhasa Kanjur 122, mdo sde, nya 189b6-190a3; Derge Kanjur-120, mdo sde, tha 130b1-4; Peking Kanjur 788, mdo sde, tu 134a8-b3; Mochizuki (1988: 429-430) . 63 Lhasa Kanjur 122, mdo sde, nya 211b2-7; Derge Kanjur 120, mdo sde, tha 144a3-7; Peking Kanjur 788, mdo sde, tu 149a5-b1; Mochizuki (1988: 457-458) . distinction of the icchantika from those who commit a pārājika and those who commit a sin of immediate retribution. The latter are indeed curable, while the former is not. Another lucid example of this distinction is found in the following passage from the same text:
64
Because those who commit a pārājika offence and those who commit the sins of immediate retribution at the time of death do not suffer a loss of mindfulness, they will be reborn in the heavenly realm. Thus, because even those who commit a pārājika offence and those who commit the sins of immediate retribution at the time of death do not suffer a loss of mindfulness, they will generate the cause [which will lead them to] awakening, whether [they are reborn] in hell or the human realm-but this does not include the icchantika.
The conclusion we must draw is that at least two distinct ideas are expressed in the Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra.
65 Further light on the overall picture may be shed by noticing a few passages in other sources. Among them, perhaps the most important scriptural source after the Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra is the La _ nkāvatāra-sū tra, in which we find the following: Mochizuki (1988: 438) . 65 The complexities of the Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra's treatment of the question of the icchantika are discussed by Shimoda (1997: 356-378) , who also discusses several of the passages I have quoted here. 66 Nanjio (1923: 65.17-67.1) . The passage has been treated by Ruegg (1969: 75-76) , and see the translation by Suzuki (1932: 58-59) , which for this section is quite good. As is usual with this particularly difficult scripture, the philological problems are many. Although I have consulted the Tibetan translation, the preliminary result of this comparison suggests that any careful study of both the published Sanskrit text and the Tibetan translation (not to mention the Chinese sources) would require considerable time, effort and space. I am thus compelled to renounce this task, and simply translate the Sanskrit text as edited.
Once again Mahā mati asked: Which one of these, Blessed One, will never attain nirvāṅ a? The Blessed One said: The bodhisattva icchantika, Mahā mati, knowing that all entities are primally in the state of nirvāṅ a will never attain nirvāṅ a. 67 But this is not so for the icchantika who has abandoned all roots of goodness. For the icchantika, Mahā mati, who has abandoned all roots of goodness will once again, thanks to the spiritual power of the Tathā gata, sometime, somehow foster roots of goodness. Why? Because no beings, Mahā mati, are thoroughly abandoned by the Tathā gatas. So, for this reason, Mahā mati, it is the bodhisattva icchantika who does not attain nirvāṅ a.
It is quite clear here that, whatever the relation may be between those who commit certain crimes, the icchantika in the ordinary sense of one devoid of roots of goodness is not permanently damned. Moreover, we see here an indication of the direction which the philosophical literature will take. One of the key concerns in both the scriptural materials and systematic treatises is, as one would expect from a tradition which considers intention the most vital element in karmic responsibility, mental attitude, rather than action as such. It is one's attitude that determines one's fate, rather than merely the actions one performs, and in this respect, most particularly one's attitude toward the truths of Buddhism. This is very well illustrated by a pair of verses from the central treatise of the Indian Tathā gatagarbha tradition, the Ratnagotravibhāga (Discrimination of the Jewelled Lineage):
68
Wise ones should not excessively fear fire, the terrible poison of a snake, a murderer, or even lightning strikes, as much as damage to the profound teaching. Fire, a snake, an enemy, and lightning may deprive one of life, but one will not on this account go toward the destiny of the extremely fearful Avīci hells. A man might constantly devote himself to evil friends, be committed to harming the Buddha, be one who performs the acts of murdering one's mother, father or an arhat, or be one who causes a schism in the best of monastic communities, but even for him liberation from that [sin of immediate retribution] would be rapid if he were to concentrate on the message of the teaching. But from where is there liberation for one whose mind is opposed to the teaching? What keeps one from liberation, what binds one to saṁ sā ra and separates one from nirvāṅ a, is not the commission of crimes, but the rejection of the truth of Buddhism. Quite a lot might be said (elsewhere) about the intolerance of this attitude, which might fairly be characterized as one of ''my way or 67 One way to understand this is to refer to the idea that because he has transcended the dichotomy of saṁ sā ra and nirvāṅ a, the bodhisattva perceives no saṁ sā ra from which he must escape. He is then not cut off from nirvāṅ a (much less bound to saṁ sā ra) so much as cut off from (the imaginary imposition of the concepts of) both saṁ sā ra and nirvāṅ a. 68 Johnston (1950: 118.15-119.4) . See the translations in Takasaki (1966: 388-389, and 1989: 213 , with notes on 381). the highway.'' What is important for us here, however, is the almost uniform Buddhist attitude toward the fate of sinners, namely that their punishment is not permanent, and thus even those guilty of the most serious crimes are not damned. The individual who is excluded from awakening forever, if there is such a being (a point upon which there is disagreement), is solely he who rejects the Buddhist teachings, clearly a different class of ''offence'' from patricide, matricide or the creation of a schism in the Buddhist monastic community. The same treatise presents one view of the nature of the icchantika systematically as follows:
69
Among [the three types of beings listed] the one who craves existence is to be understood as two-fold: those beings whose intentions are hostile to the path to liberation, who belong to the lineage of those separated from nirvāṅ a, who wish for saṁ sā ra not nirvāṅ a, and those who, though Buddhists, share the fate of those in the former group; some of these latter are enemies of the Mahāyā na.
These individuals are then classed as those who are ''fixed in falsehood,'' mithyātvaniyata.
70 Nevertheless, even for these people, who ''belong to the lineage of those separated from nirvāṅ a'' (aparinirvān : agotraka), the Ratnagotravibhāga, in speaking of the obstacles they face in grasping the pith of the Tathā gata's teaching (tathāgatadhātu), goes on to say:
71
Hostility toward the Mahāyā na is the obstacle of the icchantikas, whose antidote is the bodhisattvas' cultivation of faith in the Mahāyā na teachings.
The same idea is restated once more, when the text clearly says that hostility toward the Mahāyā na is the cause for being an icchantika, and is a temporary condition.
72 All of this makes it clear that for the Ratnagotravibhāga, there is no such thing as any individual who is completely cut off from awakening. Some other philosophical texts, it is true, disagree, 73 but even traditions of interpretation which accept the possibility that some individuals may be thoroughly barred from awakening exclude from this class those who commit sins of immediate retribution, and even more radically, also those with 69 Johnston (1950: 27.18-28. 2): tatra bhavābhilās : in : o dvividhā veditavyāh : | moks : amārgapratihatāśā aparinirvān : agotrakāh : sattvā ye saṁ sāram evecchanti na nirvān : aṁ tanniyatipatitāś cehadharmikā eva | tadekatyā mahāyānadharmavidvis : o. Cp. the trans. in Takasaki (1966 Takasaki ( : 202, 1989 : 49) (the latter of which has dropped the last clause). 70 Johnston (1950: 29.1-2) : tatra ye sattvā bhavābhilās : in : a icchantikās tanniyatipatitā ihadhārmikā evocyante mithyātvaniyatah : sattvarāśir iti. 71 Johnston (1950: 29.8-9) : mahāyānadharmapratigha icchantikānām āvaran : aṁ yasya pratipaks : o mahāyānadharmādhimuktibhāvanā bodhisattvānām. Cp. the trans. in Takasaki (1966 Takasaki ( : 205, 1989 . 72 Johnston (1950: 37.2-3) : mahāyānadharmapratigha icchantikatve hetur iti mahāyānadharma-pratighanivartārtham uktaṁ kālāntarābhiprāyen : a, trans. in Takasaki (1966 Takasaki ( : 224, 1989 . 73 For instance, the Mahāyānasū trāla _ mkāra (III.11), on which see Ruegg (1969: 80) . For a peek at some of the complex abhidharmic background to these discussions, see Jaini (1959) . mistaken views (mithyādr s : t : i), namely those whose roots of goodness are cut off (samucchinnakuśalamūla).
74 This leaves the class of the ''damned'' to comprise, oddly but consistently, those who have done nothing to motivate their inclusion.
75 According to this interpretation, those who are permanently disbarred from awakening, and the only individuals who can belong to this class, are born that way, and in this sense comparable to rocks and trees in thoroughly lacking the capacity to comprehend.
76
The end result is that for most Indian Buddhist authors, the most serious offence is to fail to believe in the Buddhist teachings, to reject the Dharma. Crimes such as the sins of immediate retribution are serious-and when improper behavior is the issue, it is consistently the sins of immediate retribution which are mentioned-but the tradition appears to be (nearly) unanimous in considering that they do not result in one's permanent estrangement from ultimate awakening, bodhi or nirvāṅ a.
The icchantika is either one who rejects the truth of Buddhism, or the individual who lacks the inborn, innate capacity to become a Buddha. He is therefore doomed to eternal rebirth in the realms of transmigration (saṁ sāra), from which liberation in nirvāṅ a is impossible.
77 On the other hand, he is in no way fated to rebirth in hell or any other unfavorable rebirth, as is the sinner who commits one or more of the transgressions of immediate retribution. What separates such a sinner from the icchantika is that, on the one hand, the sinner must suffer in an unfavorable rebirth, which the icchantika need not do, and on the other that his ultimate liberation is quite possible, if not inevitable, 74 On the idea of those whose roots of goodness are cut off, and particularly the interpretation of this notion in the Vibhās : ā, see the detailed study of Buswell (1992) . 75 Sometimes, although inconsistently, they are called the agotraka, those lacking in the essential quality of susceptibility to awakening (and therefore in this respect understood differently than in the Mahāparinirvān : a-sū tra passage we noticed above, in which the icchantika does possess the tathāgatagarbha, here equivalent to the gotra, but cannot actualize it). 76 This, in any case, is the interpretation of Sthiramati's commentary to the Mahāyānasū -trāla _ mkāra in his Sū trālan _ mkāravr ttibhās : ya, cited by Ruegg (1969: 80-81, n. 3) . This also appears to be close to the position taken by Asa _ nga in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, according to Ruegg (1969: 482) (the passage to which he refers is that numbered §52(2) in the recent comprehensive edition of the text corpus by Hayashima [2003] ). 77 One fundamental difference between this concept and that of essentially Christian ideas of eternal damnation is that the icchantika does not reach this state as a result of some action on his part, and most sources very clearly distinguish the icchantika even from one who commits the five sins of immediate retribution. Rather, this state is, so to speak, his birthright, the way he is constructed, lacking an essential component from the beginning of beginningless time, an idea which is, once more, entirely different from the Christian notion of original sin. This component, the buddha-nature (variously expressed as buddhagotra, buddhatva and so on), is what allows almost all beings to eventually-and according to this interpretation, inevitably-attain awakening.
while for the icchantika-at least as most radically conceived-the impossibility of his liberation is what defines him.
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This principle of the temporary nature of the punishment attendant on even the most serious transgression is well illustrated by a story of the eminent monk and direct disciple of the Buddha Mahā -Moggallā na, in which it is related that in a former life he murdered both of his parents. The story, offered in explanation for his murder by robbers in the present life, is found in both the commentary to the Dhammapada (Words of the Teaching) and that to the Jātaka (Stories of the Buddha's Former Lives), the latter version importantly different from the former. The Dhammapada commentary version reads as follows:
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Once upon a time there was a young man of social status, a resident of Benares, who looked after his parents by himself, taking care of the household duties such as pounding rice, cooking and so on. One day his parents said to him: ''My dear, you're exhausting yourself taking care of the household and outside duties all by yourself; we'll bring a young woman for you.'' He refused them, saying: ''Mom, Dad, there's no need to do such a thing for my sake. I'll serve you with my own hands as long as you both live.'' Again and again they begged him, [and in the end] they brought him a young woman [for his wife]. She served them for only a few days, but from then on was unwilling to bear even the sight of them, telling him with annoyance ''I can't live together in the same place with your parents.''
The wife then tricks the husband into thinking that his aged, blind parents are littering the house with dirt and bits of food, which she cannot tolerate, such that even such a one as he, who had fulfilled the Perfections, broke off relations with his parents. ''Let it be!'' he said. ''I'll discover what's to be done with them.'' And having fed [his parents], he said: ''Mom, Dad, in 78 It is true that there are sources which appear to exclude those who perpetrate the five sins of immediate retribution from salvation. A famous example (although how important it may have been in India itself is questionable) is found in the nineteenth vow of Dharmā kara, the bodhisattva who became the buddha Amitā bha, in the foundational scripture of Pure Land Buddhism, the Sukhāvatīvyū ha. Dharmā kara vows to save all who believe in him (Kagawa, 1984: 120, §8-g, vow 19 ) sthāpayitvānantaryakārin : ah : saddharmapratiks : epāvaran : āvr tāṁ ś ca sattvān, ''except those who commit the sins of immediate retribution, and those beings who are obstructed by their hostility to the true teaching.'' We notice here that from the perspective of other materials we have studied, there appears to be some conflation of what other texts treat quite separately, namely sinful actions on the one hand and apostasy or disbelief on the other. In this light, I have some doubts about Gó mez's interpretation of this exception clause (1996: 232) , since he appears to take notice only of the first of the pair of disqualified individuals. 79 Norman (1906 79 Norman ( -1914 iii.68,1-69), 10 = Burmese Sixth Council edition (Dhammagiri-Pā liGanthamālā 51 [Dhammagiri, Igatpuri: Vipasanna Research Institute, 1995] ): 39.8-26. Cp. the translation in Burlingame (1921: ii.306-307) . The story was noticed by both Malalasekera (1938: II.546-547) , and Hecker in Nyanaponika and Hecker (1997: 102-103 ).
such-and-such a place relations of yours are asking for you to come for a visit. Let's go there.'' And putting them in a cart, he went along with them. When they reached the middle of the woods, he said: ''Dad, take the reins. The oxen will go [by themselves as if they were] aware of the goad. Robbers dwell in these parts. I am going to alight.'' And giving the reins into his father's hands, he alit. As he went away, he made noises, producing a yell like [a band of] robbers. His parents heard the sounds, and thinking ''There are robbers,'' said ''Dear, we are old, just protect yourself!'' Making the robbers' yell, he beat his parents who were crying out to him like that, and killed them, throwing [their bodies] into the forest and going home.
This version of the story is presented without ambiguity: in a former life, the great monk Moggallā na, one of the chief disciples of the Buddha, renowned for his magical powers as well as his wisdom, murdered his parents deliberately, cold bloodedly and with premeditation. Perhaps demonstrating some discomfort with this directness, the more compact version of the same story recounted in the commentary to the Jātaka has Moggallā na repent at the last minute:
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Once long ago, harkening to what his wife said, he wanted to kill his parents. Leading them into the woods in a cart, he made it seem as if robbers had appeared, and he beat and struck his parents. Deprived of their ability to see shapes by their poor eyesight, they did not recognize that he was their own son, and thinking ''Robbers have come!'' they wailed only for his sake: ''Dear, some robbers are killing us. Get away!'' He thought to himself: ''Although they are being beaten by me, they wail only for my sake. What I'm doing is not right.'' Then taking care of them he pretended that the robbers had fled. He rubbed their hands and feet and said: ''Mom, Dad, don't be afraid. The robbers have fled.'' And he led them back home.
The context within which both accounts are presented, and the fact they are meant to explain, involve what we might call the ''karmic fruit loop.'' Moggallā na, the tale goes on to recount, is beaten to death by robbers, now, in the story of the present, in recompense for his beating of his own parents, related as a story of the past. This pattern of a present fact being explained by a past circumstance is the standard formula which essentially defines the Jā taka and Avadā na story literature. In the Dhammapada commentary version of our story, it is explicitly stated that his repeated experience of being beaten to death through hundreds of lives is in addition to, not instead of, his suffering numberless rebirths in hells. This is a typical application of the idea we may term ''conformable multiplied recompense,'' wherein the karmic fruit of an action resembles the action itself (a sort of lex talionis), but in much increased intensity, so that even a small act of generosity produces later wealth, for instance, or causing a certain form of harm results in one suffering a much 80 Jātaka 522 (Sarabha _ nga). Fausbøll (1877 -1896 : v.126), 11-20 = Burmese Sixth Council edition (Dhammagiri-Pā li-Ganthamālā 74 [Dhammagiri, Igatpuri: Vipasanna Research Institute, 1998 ]): 122.22-123.2. Cp. the translation in Cowell et al. (1895 Cowell et al. ( -1907 ). multiplied reflex of that harm oneself. This sort of narrative illustration of the laws of karma, in both positive and negative forms, is ubiquitous in the story literature. Even a sin so grave as the murder of one's parents, constituting two of the sins of immediate retribution (one for each parent), does not prompt the application of principles other than those already in general use. This story, therefore, illustrates the limited effects of even the worst sort of karma. Once the fruits of any act have ripened, to borrow an Indian metaphor, the seeds which gave rise to that fruit vanish.
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Since personal identity is not something limited to one physical incarnation in one life (even in the absence of a ''self''), even restrictions placed upon an individual do not follow him into death, and thus are not in any sense permanent in this ''long view.'' An illustration of this principle appears in what may at first seem an unlikely context. The five sins of immediate retribution find a place in the rules and rituals of monastic ordination, since in all traditions of Buddhist monasticism it is forbidden to ordain a specified variety of individuals. A general principle of vital import in the compilation of the list of those who may not legally be ordained imposes restrictions on any individual who has either a previous social or economic responsibility, or who might damage the reputation of the monastic community, or who might become a burden to that community. Therefore, slaves, royal servants and soldiers, for example, must not be ordained, since they owe an obligation to their owners, to the king, or to some other individual, respectively.
82 Likewise, those who are ill and whose ordination, if permitted, would tend to turn the monastic community into a vast hospice for the sick and dying are to be denied admission. Even the ugly, who might discourage lay people from drawing near and offering their generosity, are to be denied ordination.
83 If it is discovered after ordination that a monk does, in fact, belong to one of the banned categories, the appropriate response differs, but in the more serious cases it is stipulated that the offender be expelled, if for no other reason than that the presence of those who belonged to such groups would tend to bring the monastic community into disrepute. The five sins of immediate retribution are offences which impede ordination and which, if discovered later, call for expulsion. Or at least this is what the theory appears to stipulate.
81 Conversely, at least from the point of view of systematic theory, the same applies to the fruits of positive actions, which likewise can never have more than a temporary, hence limited, effect. That is to say, theoretically speaking one cannot escape the circle of transmigration, saṁ sā ra, and attain nirvāṅ a, the sunnum bonnum, through karmic action, since the results of the latter function only within the limited and endless flux of birth and rebirth. How this putatively original ''pure'' idea may have been adapted and modified in practice, if this is indeed what happened, is a question requiring separate treatment, but it is certainly true that some sources do suggest that liberation is accessible through good actions. 82 These lists, however, require further study. For instance, the treatment of debtors is considerably more complicated than it might at first seem, as discussed by Schopen (2001) . 83 A long list of physical deformities which debar one from ordination is given at Oldenberg (1879 Oldenberg ( -1883 (Mahā vagga I.71) . For a study of the list in the Pā li Vinaya and its commentary, see Sasaki (1996). It is one of the conceits of the literature of the Buddhist monastic codes, the Vinayas, that they record case law: they cite a story of the paradigmatic event which precipitated the promulgation of the rule in question. The story illustrating the rule is usually the story of the first offence. 84 The attribution of such stories sometimes appears to be fictitious, and different Vinaya texts of the different sects sometimes attribute to the same rule different origin stories. Caution would suggest that such stories be read and interpreted in terms other than as reports of actual incidents which historically led to the promulgation of particular rules of the Buddhist monastic codes. With this understanding of the nature of this material, we may turn to the following origination story presented in the Pravrajyāvastu (Section on Monastic Ordination) of the Mū lasarvāstivāda Vinaya in illustration of the prohibition of matricides from ordination:
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[Once] there was a certain householder in Ś rā vastī. He took a wife from a suitable family, and he had sex, made love and coupled with his wife, and from that sex, love making and coupling, a son was born. He said to his wife: ''Dear, we have had born to us a remover of our [spiritual] Nä ther (1975 Nä ther ( : 46.19-48.24 = 2003 ). Nä ther's text improves upon the readings given by Lé vi (1932: 27.23-29.7 ) and Dutt (1939 Dutt ( -1959 ); the Tibetan translation is edited in Eimer (1983: 309.6-312.13 ); the Chinese is found in T. 1444 (XXIII) 1038c27-1039b18 (juan 4)-this translation appears to be rather free, or perhaps based on a somewhat different original. Translations from the Sanskrit are found in Nä ther (1975: 90-93) (in German; now also in English in [2003: 45-48] , due to Claus Vogel and Klaus Wille), and Lé vi (1932: 37-39) (French), and another from Tibetan is found in Feer (1883: 94-96 ) (also French). The latter was, however, characterized by Lé vi (1932: 25) Chavannes [1910 Chavannes [ -1911 [ §478]), and again (almost certainly independently) in the 11th century Nārakapū rvikāvadāna of Kṡemendra's Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā ( §82, Das & Vidyā bhū ṡaṅ a, 1888 -1918 . See also the summary version in Tucci [1949: 517] , and the translation of Padma Chos 'phel's Ston pa'i skyes rabs dpag bsam 'khri shing in Black [1997: 371-373] ), and probably upon this basis subsequently in the Bhavaśarmāvadāna of the Aśokāvadā-namālā (edited in Iwamoto [1978: 217-230 ]; see Mejor [1992: 108, n. d.] ).
Note that in the Mū lasarvā stivā da Vinaya the prohibition of patricides from ordination, which immediately follows the prohibition of matricides (though when first introduced [Eimer, 1983: 142.7-8] they are in the opposite order), is illustrated with precisely the same story, mutatis mutandis (translated in Nä ther [2003: 52ff] from Tibetan, since the Sanskrit manuscript does not bother to repeat the story, saying only [Nä ther, 1975 [Nä ther, : 52.13-14 = 2003 ''Madam, this son of yours has made an assignation at that house. I have watched over him for the whole day. Now you watch over him for the night. That house is dangerous. He must not go into it, lest the two of you meet with disaster.'' She said: ''Young man, you did right to tell me about this.'' She provided [her son] with a bed in an inner apartment of the house, and she brought two vessels, and placing water and earth in that inner apartment arranged her own bed at the door, and went to sleep. 91 These are, of course, for the use to which we put toilet paper.
92 This has the look of a narrative interjection, not uncommon in this literature.
left. The evil being was shaking, 93 and that young girl said to him: ''Good sir, do not be afraid! There is no one else here but this young woman.'' He thought, ''I'm going to tell her what happened, and I'll become her favorite,'' and so he said: ''Dear, for your sake I killed my mother.'' She said: ''The wet nurse or your birth mother? '' 94 He said: ''My birth mother.'' She thought, ''Good god, if this guy is so oblivious to moral character that he would kill his own mother, what'll happen to me when he gets mad at me?'' And so she said: ''Good sir, stay here-I'm just going to run upstairs and I'll be right back.'' He said: ''Okay.'' She went upstairs, and yelled ''Thief! Thief!'' He got scared and fled in fear. Going to his own house, he threw down the sword at his door and cried: ''This one's the thief who killed my mother and fled. '' 95 He performed the obsequies for his mother, and went away. But the performer of evil deeds found no rest, and he visited a number of holy spots, groves of ascetics, 96 and asked them: ''Honored ones, what action might one perform to destroy evil karma?'' 93 The transition from this sentence to the next (or internally in this sentence itself) is very abrupt, and suggests that some text may be missing. While the Tibetan translation agrees with the Sanskrit (Nä ther, 1975 (Nä ther, : 47.25, 2003 Eimer, 1983: 310.22; trans. Feer, 1883: 95) , Chinese 1039a19-20 adds: ''Then he went to the wealthy man's house. After he arrived there, he saw that young woman, and his body trembled,'' 即詣長者家、既至彼已、見其少女、身形戰掉. There seem to be two basic possibilities: (1) Yijing's text contained material missing from the extant Sanskrit text, and from the source of the Tibetan translation (because it was lost in those traditions or because Yijing had a different recension), or (2) Yijing sensed the discontinuity, and patched the text. There are also other cases where the same question might arise. (My suspicion is that the second possibility is the more likely. Further careful comparative studies of Yijing's translation, which here as elsewhere often appears to be rather free, will shed light on this question.) 94 The relation between dhātrī and janitrī deserves to be explored. Notice that in Nāradasmr ti, for instance, to have sexual relations even with a wet nurse (among others) qualifies as incest (gurutalpaga) (Lariviere, 1989: 184, Strīpuṁ sayoga 72-74; trans. 157) . The treatment in the Vis : n : usmr ti (36.4-7), while similar, does not mention the dhātrī.
Employing the technical terms of kinship studies, we might translate the question ''your mater or your genetrix?'' But the Sanskrit terminology is in no way marked as particularly technical, and most (I would say all, but I work in a university) of those with whom we normally converse do not use specialized words like ''mater'' and ''genetrix'' in ordinary, much less emotionally charged, discourse. 95 It is not entirely clear who is being designated with ayaṁ sa here. The sequel, in which the son and true murderer is free to perform his mother's funeral and simply depart, suggests that he is not confessing his own guilt here (in which case we might expect *so 'haṁ instead). Rather, it may be that he is reporting his friend who tried to prevent him from meeting the girl as guilty of the crime, or simply that he is implicating some (in fact non-existent) thief in the murder he in reality committed. Feer (1883: 96) understood the Tibetan text differently: ''Lui, effrayé , é pouvanté , prit la fuite et s'en retourna chez lui. (En trouvant) le glaive qu'il avait placé pré s de la porte, il dit: Ce voleur, le voici, (c'est moi qui), apré s avoir tué ma mè re, me suis enfui.'' 96 The Sanskrit here is appositional: sa tāni (tāni) tīrthāni tapovanāni gatvā, but the Tibetan translation takes the two places serially: de mu stegs can gyi gnas dang | dka' thub kyi gnas* de dang de dag tu song ste. * Although Eimer prints gnas, he seems to suggest reading nags here, as do Vogel and Wille in Nä ther (2003: 47, n. 76). on to narrate how the monk, apparently merely on his own volition, does not in fact return to lay life, but instead travels to a remote region.
103 He converts a householder, who is so taken with him that he has a monastery constructed for the matricide, which must have been a sizable establishment rather than a mere hut, since monks come from far and wide to dwell there, and ''many directly realized the state of arhatship through his instruction. '' 104 The story continues with the eventual illness and death of this matricide. One of his disciples, who is an arhat and therefore endowed with various supernatural powers, begins to wonder where his preceptor (upādhyāya) has been reborn. Using his supernatural sight he is able to survey the realms of transmigration (saṁ sāra), beginning with that of the gods and, when he does not locate him there, descending through the realms of humans, animals and hungry ghosts. It is only when he examines the lowest realm, that of hell, that he discovers his teacher in the great Avīci hell, and upon seeking the cause of his fate learns of his master's earlier crime of matricide. This conforms perfectly with theory, which stipulates that one who commits a sin of immediate retribution will immediately be reborn precisely in the Avīci hell. Upon the matricide's death in that hell he is, thanks to his positive state of mind (kuśalacitta) at the moment of his death, reborn among the gods. He goes to hear the Buddha preach and, in the formulaic fashion common in this literature, thanks to a sermon on the Four Noble Truths ''smashes with the cudgel of wisdom the stone mountain of the mistaken philosophical view of belief in a real self, '' 105 thereby attaining the stage of ''Stream Winner,'' srotāpattiphala, the initial and lowest of the advanced stages of the path to complete awakening which culminates in arhatship. When his erstwhile disciple the arhat once again surveys the realms of transmigration in search of his former teacher, he this time finds him vanished from his former abode in hell, likewise in ascending order from the realms of animals, hungry ghosts and men, and instead dwelling now among the gods. The disciple then proclaims: ''How wonderful is the Buddha, how wonderful the Dharma, how wonderful the Saṁ gha, how wonderful the recitation of the Teachings, such that now even such evil-doers as these, who have experienced descent [into hell], attain a collection of virtues conducive to awakening such as this! '' 106 This story, like the story of Moggallā na above, does not make a fuss or commotion over the thorough redemption of the matricide. And this is quite consistent with general Buddhist doctrine. Once he has died, the offender serves his time in hell, which the text mentions here quite routinely, and then, thanks to a mere (or we had better say ''crucial'') positive mental state at the time of his death in hell, our anti-hero the matricide manages to be reborn in 103 Nä ther (1975 103 Nä ther ( : 49.2-3 = 2003 : sa saṁ laks : ayati kim idānīm avapravrajis : yāmi pratyantaṁ gacchāmīti. 104 Nä ther (1975 104 Nä ther ( : 49.6 = 2003 2): tasya cāvavādena prabhū tair arhatvaṁ sāks : ātkr tam.
105 Nä ther (1975 Nä ther ( : 50.15 = 2003 Nä ther (1975 Nä ther ( : 51.26-29 = 2003 : aho buddha | aho dharma aho saṁ gha : aho dharmasya svākhyātatā yatredānīm evaṁ vidhā api pāpakārin : o vinipātaṁ gatāh : evaṁ vidhaṁ gun : agan : am adhigacchantīti. It is not clear to me why the evil-doers are referred to here in the plural. Is it possible it is a plural of respect (see Renou, 1975: 276 §207) which the arhat uses in deference to his preceptor? one of the highest realms of transmigration, whence he is able to hear the Buddha preach and steadfastly set out himself on the correct path. Once again, the results of even severely evil actions are strictly temporary.
The Abhidharma literature specifically takes up the question of why it is possible for even such a criminal as a matricide to transcend this sin and attain to spiritual heights. While Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and its auto-commentary assert that one guilty of a sin of immediate retribution has thereby forfeited the opportunity to create further merit during the lifetime in which he committed the crime, it then goes on to quote a scripture (so far not positively identified) as saying:
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This person is not fit to connect himself to the roots of goodness in this present life, but he will certainly connect himself to those roots of goodness when he has died [and been reborn] One might be tempted to see traces of a radical idea here. Unlike other karmic seeds, which may lay dormant, as it were, for any number of lifetimes, the sin of immediate retribution must bear fruit directly after death. The process from sin to redemption, then, in these five most severe cases is promised to be quicker than the equivalent process might be for less serious offences, although the punishment is also correspondingly more acute. I do not know whether traditional sources take note of this dynamic, and if so what they have made of it.
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Our survey of the five sins of immediate retribution has brought us full circle, from perdition to redemption. Indian Buddhist tradition speaks of a set group of crimes which it considers the most serious imaginable. But even such crimes do not have permanent effects; every act, no matter how criminal, evaporates as its results become manifest. This is a direct reflection of the overwhelmingly positive ethics of Buddhism, which stems from its most basic metaphysics. Nothing lasts forever, and even the worst evil will, inevitably, make room for the very highest good, in the end.
107 My translation includes in brackets the commentary's gloss. Abhidharmakośabhās : ya ad IV.80d, Pradhan (1975: 250.20-22) : abhavyo 'yaṁ pudgalo dr s : t : a eva dharme kuśalamū lāni pratisaṁ dhātuṁ niyatam ayaṁ narakebhyaś cyavamāno vā upapadyamāno vā kuśalamū lāni pratisaṁ dhāsyatīti. Saeki (1887: 711) (17a4,9) identified the quotation as from Madhyamāgama juan 37, a quick look at which did not turn up an equivalent passage. However, Pāsā dika (1989b: 89) ( §342) cites-with ''?''-the suggestion of Fujita Kō tatsu that the sentence corresponds to T. 26 (I) 601a25 (juan 27-suggesting that Saeki's reference is misprinted), but I confess that I cannot see the putative connection there either. However, as Saeki already pointed out, precisely the same point is made in the Vibhās : ā as well (T. 1545 [XXVII] 184b89 [juan 35], with the larger discussion beginning at 184a1 and continuing).
